PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ATTACHMENT.

The proper practice, where a levy has been made upon
the bankrupt's property under an attachment, granted within
the four months period, is for the trustee to

I move in the state court for an order discharging
the attachment and releasing the property from the levy;
the sheriff should not be required to assume the responsibility
of releasing thie levy. Hardt v. Schuylkill, etc. Co., 74
N. Y. Supp. 549.
BANKRUPTCY.

The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has held that the complaint in an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside
transfers of property by the bankrupt, on the
Setting
Aside
ground that they are fraudulent as to creditors,
Transfer
must show that the plaintiff has not sufficient
assets in his hands belonging to"the estate to satisfy the
claims of the creditors. Mueller v. Bruss, 112 Wis. 406.
It is also held in the same case that a judgment and return
of an execution unsdtisfied are not necessary to enable a trustee in bankruptcy to maintain an action in equity to set asidetransfers of property by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors,
since under the Bankrupt Act neither the trustee nor creditors
whom he represents could obtain such a judgment.
Upon the principle that in all cases not within the provisions of the Bankrupt Law, the state insolvency laws remain operative, it was held in Ierron Co. v.
State La
Superior Ct., 68 Pac. 814 (Sup. Ct., Cal.), that
as to a mining corporation which may not be adjudicated
bankrupt, the provisions of the state insolvent law applicable
to such corporations are not suspended.
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That the amount disbursed for attorney's fees by an
assignee for creditors, prior to filing his petition in the bankAssignor's
ruptcy court. for the settlement of his accounts
Estate
forms no part of the assignor's estate in bankruptcy, was held In re Klein, 8 Am. B. R. 559, and no summary order directing the assignee to pay over to the trustee
should be made as to such disbursements.
That there is a limit to the right to amend would appear
from In re Moebius, 8 Am. B. R. 59 o , where it was held
Amending
that leave to amend an original proof of claim
Claim
made after the expiration of the year after adjudication must be denied, as the effect would be to permit
proof of a debt in violation of section 57n.
BILLS AND NOTES.

In adopting the interpretation that will give to the words
"same class" in section 6oa in the United States Bankruptcy
Act relating to preference, the meaning probably
Prefernc
intended, it was held In re Harpke, 8 am. B. R.
535, that the holder of the bankrupt's unindorsed note is
not debarred from proving his claim thereon, because
within the four months period he received from the indorser
payment of another note, having reason to believe that the
money therefor had come from the bankrupt, though in
ignorance of his insolvency at the time of such payment.
In Carroll v. Nrodine, 69 Pac. 51, the Supreme Court of
Oregon holds that while an unqualified indorsement of
Indorsement negotiable paper is a written contract excluding
without
parol evidence to vary its terms, an indorsement
Recourse
without recourse is not a contract, but merely
operates to transfer the title; and hence parol evidence is
admissible to show that at the time of the transfer of a
note bv indorsement without recourse, the buyer agreed to
take the paper at his own risk, absolutely relieving the
indorser even from the implied warranty of genuineness
attending such a transfer. • The court says "There is an
intimation in a note to Drennan v. Bunn, (Il.) 7 Am. St.
Rep. 354, 366 (s. c. 16 N. E. ioo), that the general rule that
oral evidence is inadmissible to change the contract of
indorsement relates to restrictive indorsements also, and
extended, it applies to indorsements without recourse."
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'But "we have been unable to find any case covering the exact point here." The court goes on to base its
decision upon analogies drawn from the sale of personal
property.
CARRIERS.

In Glover v. Cape GirardeauB. & S. R. Co., 69 S. W.
599, the Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Mo., holds that
where, on delivery of goods to a carrier, no ar
instructions are given it as to the route -of carriage, and it sends them over a connecting line by a circuitous route, so that the charges are in excess of what they
would have been if sent by the most direct line, the delivering carrier is entitled to the freight paid by it to the initial
carrier.
The Supreme Court of Alabama holds in Birmingham
Ry. Light and Power Co. v. Nolan, 32 Southern, 715, that
punitive damages may be recovered of a carrier
Punitive
Damages
by a passenger, where, through willfulness or
gross negligence of the conductor, the passenger was carried
by the place at which, when paying her fare, she told the conductor she wanted to get off. "It is settled that the infliction
of actual damage is not essential to the imposition of exemplary damages. Railroad Co. v. Sellers, 93 Ala. 9."

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

The Supreme Court of the United States deals in Hanover
National Bank v. Moyses, 22 S. C. R. 857, with the conwkruptcy

stitutionality of the bankruptcy law, and holds;

first that the constitutional requirement that
bankruptcy laws be uniform throughout the United States
is not violated by the Act of 1898, though it provides in the
sixth section that bankrupts are allowed the exemptions pre-'
scribed by the state law in force at the-time of the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy, and second, that the recognition of the local law by the act, in the matter of exemptions,
dower, priority of payments, and the like, does not render
the act void as an attempt by Congress unlawfully to delegate its legislative power.
Act
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In Colorado the Denver City charter provides that no
saloon shall keep in connection therewith any wine room,
Intoxicating
into which any female shall be permitted to
tiquors

enter and -be supplied with liquor. The Supreme

Court of Colorado holds in Adams v. Cronin, 69 Pac. 59o ,
that this is not unreasonable as a discrimination against
women on account of sex. "If," says the court, "a discrimination is made against women solely on account of
their sex, it would not be good; but if it is because of the
immorality that would be likely to result if the regulation
was not made, the regulation would be sustained." Construing it in this latter light, the court decides as above indicated.

CONTRACTS.

The U. S. Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit) holds in
Beasley v. Texas, etc. Ry. Co., 115 Fed. 952, that a contract
Railroads,

by which a railroad company agrees to establish

and maintain a station at a particular place, and
not to establish and maintain any other station within a certain distance therefrom, is contrary to public policy, and
cannot be enforced in a court of equity; but the court inclines to the view that the illegality of the agreement should
not deprive one who on the faith of it, and without wrongful intent, has conveyed valuable property to the company,
of a remedy at law. See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Central Transp. Co., 171 U. S. 138.
Validity

A provision in a contract to do work for a city that there
shall be no assignment of it does not prevent the assignment of a claim for work done under it, and for
Provision
against
damages for breach by the city; there having
Assignment

been a breach by it, and the work having been

completed by another: N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate
Division, First Department) in Snyder v. City of New
York, 77 N. Y. Supp. 637. See Mellen v. Insurance Co.,
17 N. Y. 609.

In Doyle v. Edwards, 91 N. W. 322, the Supreme Court
of South Dakota holds that a contract to pay a physician
from $200 to $400 for the performance of a
Definiteness
surgical operation was not too indefinite to be
valid, but was binding and valid for $200 and the value of

PROGRESS OF THE- LAW.
CONTRACTS (Continued).

the services, up to $40o, upon proof of such value Compare
Kramer v. Ewing, 6I Fac. lO64, and also United Press v.
Neiv York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 4o6, which latter case is
distinguished by the court in the principal case.

DAMAGES.

The measure of damages recoverable against connecting
carriers for improper treatment of catt1 shipped over their
lines is the difference between their market value
Connecting
Carer
at their final destination and what it would'have
been but for the improper treatment, and the fact that each
carrier limited its liability to its own line, and that none of
them carried the cattle to the place of final destination is
immaterial: Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Gulf, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Houghton, 68 S. W. 718. See in connection
with this case Railway Co. v. Stanley, 89 Tex. 44

DIVORCE.

The definition of what constitutes cruelty sufficient to be
a ground for divorce cannot be said to be generally agreed
upon, and in many jurisdictions is very indefiExtreme
Cruelty
nite. In Ellison v. Ellison, 91 N. W. 403, the
Supreme Court of Nebraska holds that any unjustifiable
conduct, on the part of either the husband or the wife, which
so grievously Wounds the mental feelings of the other, or
so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other, as to
seriously impair the bodily health and endanger the life of
the other, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends and
objects of matrimony, constitutes "extreme cruelty," although no physical or personal violence may be inflicted, or
even threatened.
FORMER JEOPARDY.

Where, on a trial for assault and battery in a court having jurisdiction to finally determine the charge, it appears
AssauIt

that the offence was an assault with intent to

rape, the accused having been in jeopardy under
the charge of assault and battery, he could not
be bound over to answer the charge of assault with intent to
and
Battery
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rape: Supreme Court of Alabama in State v. Blemis, 32
Southern, 637. In connection with this we may cite another
very recent case, the case of People v. McDaniels, where it
is held that conviction of a battery is a bar to a prosecution
for assault with intent to commit murder.

FRAUD.

The Supreme Court of Nebraska holds in Klein v. Pederson, 91 N. W. 281, that a party in pari delicto cannot make
Reoery of his illegal act a basis of recovery; but where the
Money Paid
stronger mind takes possession of the weaker,
or where, through ignorance and without any intent to
violate the law, one is led by fraud and misrepresentation to
the performance of an act against public policy, the courts
will not deny him relief against those whose fraud persuaded
him to act, and who seek to profit therefrom. Compare
Hess v. Culver, 77 Mich. 598, and also Duval v. Wellman,
124 N. Y. 156.
HOMICIDE.

In State v. Bonowiglio, 52 Atl. 712, the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey holds that under the law of New
Jersey, a person upon whom an attempt to rob
Justiflcation
is being made, is justified in taking the life of
his assailant, even when other and less radical means would
render the attempt abortive. His right to kill, it is said, is
absolute. Three judges dissent.
In Texas the Penal Code (Art. 77) provides that if any
one prepare any means by which a person may injure himAssisting
self with intent that he shall thereby be injured,
Suicide
he shall, by the use of such indirect means,
become a principal. In Grace v. State, 69 S. W. 529, it is
held that this provision has no application to suicides, and
does not make one who knowingly furnishes a suicide with
the means of killing himself guilty of murder. It is further
said: "It is not a violation of any law in Texas for a person
to take his own life.

.

.

.

So far as the law is con-

cerned the suicide is innocent; therefore, the party who furnishes the means to the suicide must also be innocent of
violating the law."
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In an action to recover from an alleged surety upon an indemnity bond, the evidence tended to show that the party
sought to be charged as such surety intended to
Defence
sign same as a witness, but inadvertently placed

his signature thereto under the name of the obligor, instead
of in the proper place for the witness -to sign. Under these
facts the Supreme Court of Minnesota holds in United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Siegmann, 91 N. W.
473, that between the original parties to the transaction in
a suit to charge such alleged surety, that he is not estopped
from claiming that he did not execute te instrument as a
surety, although no facts were pleaded or proved to show
that any fraud had been perpetrated to induce him to sign
the bond in the apparent capacity in which his name appeared
therein. Compare In re Knox's Estate, 131 Pa. 230.

INJUNCTION.

. The N. Y. Supreme Court (Appellate Division, Third
Department) holds in Harvey v. National Drug Co., 77
Trade
N. Y. Supp. 647, that where an employe of a
Secrets

company manufacturing certain pharmaceutical

preparations by secret formulm and processes, after learning
such secrets, became an officer of a rival corporation, and
thus communicated and used such formulo and processes in
the manufacture of similar preparations, such use should
be enjoined; but where such employe took copies of prescriptions sent to the first comhpany by various physicians to
a rival company, the first company had not such interest in
the prescriptions as would entitle it to an injunction to
restrain such use by its rival, though the employe learned
the prescriptions in the course of his employment.'
INSANITY.

On a prosecution for bigamy the defendant testified that he
knew that it was legally wrong to marry a second time without'a divorce, but that he had .been told by God
Bigamy that it was not wrong. A physician testified
that the defendant was religiously or emotionally insane,
and did not believe he was able to distinguish between right
and wrong, with regard to the crime of bigamy. The Court
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of Criminal Appeals of Texas holds upon these facts that
all the evidence was confined to the issue of moral insanity,
and that the jury were, therefore, justified in finding the
defendant guilty: Harrison v. State, 69 S. W. 5oo. "If a
party had, at the tirie of the commission of the act, such
degree of reason and understanding as is sufficient to enable
him to understand that his act was forbidden by law, and
that the law directed that the person who did such act should
be punished, he is responsible :" Cannon v. State (Texas),
56 S. W. 361. One judge dissents on the ground that the
evidence shows an inability to distinguish right from wrong,
and this should acquit the defendant.
INSURANCE.

In Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Urbansky, 68 S. Wi.
653, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds that where a
Powers of
man authorized one who was agent for several
Agents
companies to select the companies in which to
place insurance of a certain amount, the agent had no authority, after selecting the companies and issuing the policies, to
cancel one of the policies, without notice to the insured, and
substitute for it a policy in another company, though the
cancelled policy had not been actually delivered, since an
enforceable contract would have existed if no policy had
been issued at all; and, therefore, the cancelled policy
remained in force.
In Steinmeyer v. Steinmeyer, 42 S. E. 184, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina holds that an insurance policy
insurable
requiring sole and unconditional ownership is
Interest,
void when taken out by the grantee of realty
not
OwnerSole
ship
by deed of gift, though the deed has been
adjudged void as against the grantor's creditors. The
grantee is held to have had an insurable interest and, "With
respect to any right of the insurance company, the insured
by the grant of the owner, was invested with the fee-simple
title at the time of the insurance. The insured's ownership
was sole, because no one else had any interest in the property, and it was unconditional because the quality of her
estate therein was not limited or affected by any condition.
The right of the grantor's creditors in certain contingencies
to subject said property to their claims did not give such
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creditors any interest in the property as owners, nor did the
judgment declaring the deed void as against creditors operate to restore the fee to the grantor, with respect to the insurance company. The existence of a lien or incumbrance on
the insured's property is not a breach of the condition which
requires sole and unconditional ownership." See Insurance
Co. v. Weill, 28 Grat. 389.
JUDGMENT.

Where pending an action to recovdr the value of goods
alleged to have been sold and delivered in reliance upon defendant's false representations as to his financial
Cancelling
condition, he is discharged in bankruptcy, a
judgment in said action subsequently and regularly entered
reciting that, "upon the trial the plaintiffs having withdrawn
all allegations of fraud in their complaint the defendants consented that the plaintiffs may have judgment for the amount
claimed with interest," is not affected by the discharge in
bankruptcy, and defendants are not entitled to an order
directing said judgment to be canceled and discharged of
record, under section 1268 of the Code of Civil Procedur6.
Stevens v. Meyers, 8 Am. B. R. 446.
LEASE.

Where the owner of farm land leases the same, reserving to
himself the right to enter thereon and prepare the ground for
or sow a crop of wheat, and when it is provided
Rights of
Landlord,
in the agreement that for such purpose "he and
Assignment
his servants and agents may enter upon such
premises without let or hindrance, and the parties of the
second part hereby waive all claims for damages incident
thereto," the right of such landlord so to enter upon the
lands for the purposes named in the agreement, is assignable
and may be conveyed to a tenant: Supreme Court of Kansas
in Brewster v. Gracey, 69 Fac. 199.
LIMITATIONS.

In Ewbank v. Ewbank, 42 S. E. 194; the.Supreme Court
of South Carolina holds that an equitable mortgage, as well
Renewal of
as the note secured thereby, barred by limitaDebt
tions, is revived, as between the original holders,
by a payment on the note.
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In Levor v. Seiter, 8 Am. B. R. 459, reversing 5 id. 576,
(Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First
Dept.), it was held that where money collected
Peerenc
upon an execution issued upon a judgment obtained against the bankrupt within the four months period
is paid over to the judgment creditor before the filing of
the petition in bankruptcy, the case does not fall within the
provisions of section 67f of the Bankrupt Act, and that such
money is not recoverable back by the trustee under section
6ob, in the absence of proof that the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt, by suffering judgment to be taken against him, intended to give a preference.
LUNATIC.

That a lunatic may not be adjudged a bankrupt upon the
petition of his committee was held in Matter of Eisenberg,
8 Am. B. R. 55I, upon the ground that the
Bankrupt
petitiot court had no jurisdiction to entertain such
petition.

MARRIAGE.

Under the statute law of California it is provided that
a subsequent marriage contracted by any divorced person
Extraterriduring the life of a former husband or wife is
toral Effect void unless the decree of divorce in the case of
the former marriage has been rendered at least one year
prior to the subsequent marriage. A woman within five
months after obtaining a divorce in California, was married
in Nevada, to a citizen thereof in accordance with the laws
of that state. In re Wood's Estate, 69 Pac. 9oo, the
Supreme Court of California holds that this marriage was
valid in California, the prohibition of remarriage except after
a certain time having no extraterritorial effect. Three
judges dissent, on the ground that the first divorce is not
absolute until the lapse of a year, and that consequently at
the time of the second marriage the woman was not in a
situation to contract marriage. *
It is interesting to compare with this decision, the decision
of the same court in Wood v. Wood's Estate, 69 Pac. 981,
a case arising in relation to the same persons as above. The
court holds that though it recognizes the validity of the
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marriage -it.will not enforce a contract by .which, in consideration of this -marriage, and a release of interest by the
wife in the husband's property, he agreed to pay her $IO,ooo,'since the consideration was in violation of the spirit of
the California law.
MORTGAGE.

A formal release of a mortgage executed by the mortgagee
extinguishes the lien of the mortgage, whether the same is
R lease,
fully paid or not. If the reledse is made through
Reinstatement inadvertence or mistake the lien of the, mortgage may be reinstated by proper proceedings taken therefor. Supreme Couit of Nebraska in Gadsden v. Johnson, 91
N. W. 285.
MUNICIPAL BON.DS.

In Board of Commissioners v. Vandriss, 115 Fed. 866,
the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) holds
Estoppel by
that where municipal bonds were sold in the
Recitals
open market for full value to purchasers who
had no knowledge of any facts impairing their validity, the
municipality is estopped to deny the truth of any recitals
therein stating the act authorizing their issuance and certifying that "all acts, conditions, and things required to be
done precedent to and in the issuing of said bonds have
been properly done, happened and performed in regular and
due form as required by law;" and the bonds cannot be
defeated unless they themselves, or the act under which they
were issued, or both, when read together, disclosed that they
were issued Without authority or not in conformity with
law.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

The extent to which police power may be exercised by a
municipality and the manner of its exercise furnished an
Police

important question in Richmond Safety Gate

Powers . Co. v. Ashbridge, 116 Fed. 220.. An act of
Pennsylvania (May 5, 1899), provided that cities of the first
class might, by general ordinance, regulate the management
and inspection of elevator hoistings and elevator shafts in
such cities. Acting under this act the City of Philadelphia
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provided that "full automftatic gates, wherever found, will be
condemned, and must be replaced within -a reasonable time
by gates approved, etc." The U. S. Circuit Court (E. D.
Pennsylvania) holds that the city under the above a& has
no power to condemAi without inspection, and by a general
regulation an entire class of elevator appliances, and to
require their removal wherever found, whether such regulation is adopted by ordinance or by the bureau of building
inspection under authority given by an ordinance; and a
manufacturer of such appliances is entitled to an injunction
to restrain the enforcement of such a regulation as unreasonable, where it will work irreparable injury to him if enforced.
See also City of Philadelphiav. Western Union Tel. Co., 32
C. C. A. 246.
NEGLIGENCE.

A railroad company took charge of an employe afflicted
with smallpox and hired one to guard and nurse him. While
Proximat,

the patient was delirious with fever, the nurse

fell asleep, and the patient escaped and wandering on the plaintiff's premises communicated the disease to
his child. Under these facts the Court of Civil Appeals of
Texas, holds in Missouri, etc. Ry. Co. v. Wood, 68 S. W.
8o2, that the evidence showed liability for the injuries due
to the communication of the disease. See also Railroad Co.
v. Wood, 66 S. W. 449. It is not, the court holds, contributory negligence on the part of the father that he had
failed to have the child vaccinated.
Cause

OVERDRIVING HORSE.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey holds in Newbury v.
Luke, 52 Atl. 625, that in an action to recover damages for
Hiring-on
the overdriving of a horse, the :fact that the
Sunday
defendant hired the horse from the plaintiff
upon a Sunday, for the purposes of Sunday driving, and
was driving on that day, in violation of the law of New Jersey, constitutes no defence. In such a case, is is said, the
overdriving, and not the Sunday violation, is the proximate
cause of the injury and the maxim, "In pari delicto," etc.,
has no application.
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klRTIES.

The Supreme Court of Kansas holds in Atchinson, etc.,
'.ailroad Co. v. Anderson, 69 Pac. 158, that in an action
-Jbstructon against a railroad company for damages in lay1lghway of

ing a track in a public street and obstructing the

*Agress and egress of a lot owner tq and from his property,
vhere it appeared that the company sued was not the owner
:f the track when it was built, nor at the time the action was
c;ommenced, but was a lessee only, the.lessor company which
iaid the track and caused the obstruction was a necessary
party. See also Railway Co. v. Cuykendall, 42 Kans. 234.
PARTNERSHIP.

The powers of the court being sufficient to fairly protect
Lhe equities of the individual creditors where the facts justify
it, it was held by Shires, Dist. J., In re Green,
Priority
is8
Am. B. R. 553, that where an individual
is adjudged- a bankrupt, parties to whom he is indebted,
in connection with other persons as partners, may share
in his estate with his individual creditors, it not appearing that there is any solvent partner from whom the
debt can be collected, nor any partnership assets to which
the firm creditors can look for payment of their just claims.
PUBLIC OFFICERS.

In Carter v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland, 32
Southern, 632, the Supreme Court of Alabama holds that
Bonds,
where a surety-on a bond of a public officer has
Sureties
been held liable thereon, his right to contribution
from the sureties on other bonds is not limited to the actual
default of the officer, but includes the costs of defending the
suit on the bond; such defence not being frivolous or
unnecessary.
SEDUCTION.

The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in a carefully reasoned
opinion upon a case of seduction, concludes by summarizing
the law as follows: "We conclude, therefore,
Definition
that the word 'seduction' When- applied to the
conduct of a man towards a woman, means the use of some
influence, artifice, promise, or means on his part, by which
he induces the woman who is then, and has theretofore for
a reasonable time been, a woman of chaste conduct, to sub-
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mit to unlawful intercourse with him. To this may be added,
if the evidence justifies it, a statement that proof of former
unchastity may be considered in mitigation of damages, and
to show that sexual intercourse was without enticement,
artifice, persuasion or solicitation, but is not of itself a
defence if the plaintiff had, for a reasonabie time before the
alleged seduction, been leading a virtuous life." The case
is Stowers v. Singer, 68 S. W. 637. See also Pattersonv.
Hayden, 17 Oreg. 238.
SLANDER OF TITLE.

In Butts v. Long, 68 S. V. 754, the Court of Appeals at
St. Louis, Mo., holds that slander may be perpetrated by two
Joint
persons jointly. The court is discussing slander
Wrong
of title but speaks of slander generally. See
State v. Marlier, 46 Mo. App. 233.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

The N. Y. Supreme Court (Special Term, N. Y. County)
holds in Haffey v. Lynch, 77 N. Y. Supp. 587, that where a
Defect in
vendor having a marketable title to land, conTitle
tracted to sell it at a time fixed, but was unable
to do so because of a defect which arose after the making
of the contract, and without the fault of the vendor, the
vendee could obtain specific performance later when the
defect had disappeared at the time of the trial of the action.
SURETY.

The surety on a note who, after the maker's adjudication
as a bankrupt, pays the balance due thereon, cannot be rec a mis.

quired as a condition of filing his claim therefor,

to surrender preferential payments received by
the payee of the note. In re New, 8 Am. B. R.
566, holding that the latter part of section 5 7 i was not intended as a restriction upon the surety creditor.
Bankrupt
Principal

TAXES.

That a franchise tax due and owing by a corporation at
its adjudication as a bankrupt is a "tax" within the meaning
On
of section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, and is enCorporation titled to priority of payment, is held in Matter
Franchise
of Mutual Mercantile Agency, & Am. B. R. 435.
See 4 Thomp. Corp., sec. 5,56o.
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TOLL ROADS

In Mobrey v. Cape Girardeau,etc., Road Co., 69 S. W.
394, the Court of Appeals at St. Louis, Mo., holds that
Personal
where persons riding on a toll road paid toll to
Injuries
a certain point at which they usually left the
road, and, on reaching it, decided, because of darkness and
an approaching storm, to continue thereon, they were not
thereby rendered trespassers or precluded from recovering
for injuries caused by defects in the road.
TRESPASS.

The Court of Appeals of New York deals in Magar v.
Hammond, 64 N. E. 150, with the question of the liability
Injury to
of an owner of land to a trespasser, where the
Trespassers
act by which the trespasser suffers is voluntary.
The facts were as follows: The defendant had established
a fish preserve, and posted notices as prescribed by statute.
To protect the fish from poachers, he employed a night
watchman, who was in the habit of discharging. fire-arms
into the air to frighten off the poachers. The plaintiff with
knowledge of such facts, on a dark night entered the park
for the purpose of poaching and was injured by a bullet fired
by the watchman in the direction of the noise made by the
plaintiff. The court holds that the lower court committed
error in refusing to charge, in an action to recover for the
injuries, that, if the plaintiff knew the habit of the watchman, he could not recover, even if the defendant or the
watchman were negligent. No authorities are cited and it
may be questioned whether the case does not mark a departure from the current of authority upon this subject.
TRUSTS.

The right of a cestui que trust to follow trust funds'was
considered In re Marsh, 8 Am. B. R. 576, where it was held
Following
that unless a trust fund, the greater portion of
Funds
which came into the hands of the bankrupt, as
trustee, several years prior to his bankiuptcy -can be traced
in some shape into the estate which came into the hands of
his trustee in bankruptcy, the equitable owners of such fund
are not entitled to priority of payment over the -general
creditors, and upon the claimants is the burden of proof to
show the fact.
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USURY.

In Anderson v. Oregon Mortgage Co., 69 Pac. -130, the
Supreme Court of Idaho holds that no one but a party to
a contract can avail himself of the defence of
Parties
, usury, and that consequently the grantee of a

mortgagor who assumes the payment of the mortgage cannot set up such defence. The mortgagor "has in effect put the
money in the hands of respondents with which to pay said
debt, and they agreed to pay it, and without authority from
him they are trying to avoid the payment thereof by setting
up the usurious contract." This, it is held, may not be done.

WATER COURSES.

In Fisher v. Feige, 69 Pac. 618, the Supreme Court of
California holds that damage to a riparian owner resulting
Riparlan
from the diminution of the flow of water inciRights
dent to the cutting of trees by a riparian owner
higher up the stream, thereby causing an increase of evaporation, is damnum absque injuria. Nor can the motive of the
riparian owner in thus cutting the trees growing along the
bank of a river affect the lawfulness of such acts with respect
to the rights of riparian owners lower down the stream.
See Mayor, etc. v. Pickles [1895], App. Cas. 587.
WILLS.
A will provided that on the death of certain legatees before
the time limited for the payment thereof, the share of any
Construction; deceased legatee should be paid over to their
"Next
"next of kin" according to the statute of distriof Kin"
butions. The Court of Appeals of New York,
interpreting this part of the will, holds In re Devoe, 63 N.
E. 1102, that the widow of a deceased legatee is not entitled
to share in the legacy her husband would have taken had
he lived at the time of the payment since she is not of "the
next of kin," and the direction as to such payment does not
extend the meaning so as to include the widow. Two
judges dissent. The fact that so many wills provide substantially as this one did makes the case an interesting precedent. Compare Platt v. Mickle, 137 N. Y. io6.

